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Gould et al. (2014) refreshingly devote an
entire paper to investigating the detailed
experience of a synaesthete (AB), using
a rigorous qualitative method. Their
paper addresses sequence-space synaes-
thesia, in which people associate members
of sequences such as months or num-
bers with specific spatial locations that
together create an overall spatial pat-
tern or “form” for each sequence. I have
previously argued that sequence-space
synaesthesia shows strong continuity with
normal voluntary visuospatial imagery
(Price, 2009, 2013), and may be an exten-
sion of normal childhood development
of visuospatial skills (Price and Pearson,
2013). Additionally I have suggested that
behavioral evidence for the automaticity
of this synaesthesia is less robust than often
claimed (Price and Mattingley, 2013).
Gould et al.’s data provide striking support
for these claims.
Take continuity with normal visuospa-
tial imagery:
(1) Some spatial forms seem indistinguish-
able from normal imagery: e.g., AB’s
multiple and dynamic “spatial forms”
for clock-time constitute a vivid visual
imagery of clocks that would unlikely
be considered synaesthetic if reported
by a non-synaesthete.
(2) Spatial relationships of sequence items
are only a subset of AB’s total visu-
alization experience: e.g., Equations
and graphs are visualized together
with numerals on his number line;
scenes of embryonic development are
associated with his autobiographical
timeline; his alphabet form resides
within the dark, muddy atmosphere
of a cave, itself part of an expansive
landscape.
(3) Imagery when attending single
sequence items is similar to normal
alphanumeric imagery: e.g., Individual
numerals/letters are often imaged in
isolation from the rest of AB’s num-
ber or alphabet form, and although
these images contain salient color,
texture, and font, they do not seem
so far removed from non-synaesthetic
ability to visualize graphemes.
(4) Like normal imagery, aspects of the
synaesthetic imagery can be somewhat
modulated voluntarily: e.g., AB can
effortfully but unstably modify the
font of single letters or numerals in a
form.
(5) Like normal visual imagery, spatial
forms can be mentally scanned: e.g., AB
appears to intentionally shift atten-
tion from one sequence member to
another, progressively reconstructing
his spatial form by activating long
term memory of the relative locations
of sequence members.
Next consider how voluntary attention
mediates AB’s experiences:
(1) Attentional movement is required to
activate parts of AB’s number line that
were not previously in focus.
(2) Focal attention increases stability of
AB’s synaesthetic experience (just as
maintenance of normal visual imagery
is considered an effortful process,
drawing on executive capacity).
(3) AB superimposes his spatial forms
flexibly on physical space, avoiding
crowded parts of the external
environment or choosing to place
the form on a particular surface.
(4) Without attention, spatial forms may
not be induced at all. AB sometimes
engages with letters and numbers
without triggering any synaesthetic
experience. Synaesthetic induction is
not obligatory, but context dependent
and susceptible to task interference.
Gould et al.’s data go beyond merely exem-
plifying previous claims. AB’s distinction
between physical space and the “men-
tal room” in which his synaesthesia is
experienced is perhaps not so novel as
suggested by the authors, because it is
pre-empted by earlier self-report surveys
(Phillips, 1897; Sagiv et al., 2006) and
autobiographical accounts (Tyler, 2005,
pp. 34–35), but descriptions of complex
interaction between AB’s physical and
mental spaces seem more detailed than
previous accounts. They also challenge
simplistic dichotomy between projector
and associator synaesthesia. Moreover, the
reliance of AB’s synaesthesia on inter-
nally verbalizing the name of the inducer
does seem a novel contribution to our
knowledge (and is consistent with sug-
gestions that spatial forms arise when
visuospatial codes are adopted to help
retention of sequences whose individ-
ual members are primarily learned via
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auditory exposure). Gould et al. stress that
aspects of these experiences were previ-
ously unknown even to the synaesthete,
and that the formal qualitative method
of the Elicitation Interview (EI), adopted
in their study, can uncover such previ-
ously hidden phenomenology. It should
nevertheless be noted that more informal
introspection can also reveal novel aspects
of synaesthetic experience. For example,
Tyler (2005, p. 36) describes how he first
thought his synaesthetic color associations
were limited to numbers, “but then I
started running through the letters of the
alphabet and realized that, indeed, they
did evoke particular colors when I paid
attention to this modality.” Whether the EI
method is necessary for some kinds of dis-
covery, or merely corroborates what can be
revealed by more informal introspection,
is therefore open to question.
In any case, it follows that introspective
studies can transform synaesthetes’ experi-
ences rather than merely articulating them
in neutral fashion. This violates the def-
initional synaesthetic criterion of consis-
tency over time, convergent with other
recent claims that synaesthetic concur-
rents can change over shorter and longer
time scales (Simner, 2012; Meier et al.,
2014). So how do the contents of synaes-
thetic experience change during detailed
introspective exploration? Are the new
experiences de novo creations, or shifts
from preconscious to conscious represen-
tations. Alternatively, some synaesthetic
experience may initially color what James
(1890; Mangan, 1993) referred to as the
unattended “fringe” of sensory aware-
ness, but be brought into focal aware-
ness via introspective dialog. Future work
needs to empirically distinguish these
possibilities.
An obvious question with single-case
studies is the extent to which the partici-
pant is representative. Gould et al. consider
AB a “normal” sequence-space synaes-
thete as his experiences are consistent with
previous reports in the literature (although
they also acknowledge that AB’s introspec-
tive dialog may have modified his expe-
riences beyond what is typical). However,
normality is a questionable concept here
because the character of this variety of
synaesthesia seems to vary among indi-
viduals along many dimensions. These
include automaticity, complexity, visual vs.
spatial quality, projector-associator gradi-
ent, spatial reference frame and types of
spatial transformation that can be applied
(Price, 2009, 2013). For example, AB
reports his spatial forms are flexibly placed
into an environmental reference frame. By
contrast, other synaesthetes report spatial
forms that aremore egocentrically defined.
A thorough taxonomy for spatial forms is
still missing from the field, but the type of
research provided by Gould et al. helps us
map the territory that needs to be included
in such a taxonomy.
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